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Introduction  
 
The Prevent strategy, published by the Government in 2011, is part of the United Kingdom’s 
wider counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. The aim of the Prevent strategy is to reduce the 
threat to the UK from terrorism by stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting 
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Abstract 
This policy recommendation proposes the implementation of the Terrorism, Radicalisation 
and Extremism Disclosure Scheme (TREDS) as an additional measure to Prevent and 
counter violent extremism and terrorism in the United Kingdom. TREDS represents a 
viable mechanism for a responsible adult (‘the applicant’) to make a disclosure request to 
joint local authority and Police Prevent teams where they feel an individual (‘the subject’) 
may pose a risk to a young or vulnerable person (‘the person at-risk’) in relation to 
terrorism, radicalisation or extremism. A successful disclosure is intended to empower the 
‘applicant’ to take proactive steps to safeguard the ‘person at risk’ from the risk of harm 
posed by the ‘subject’, and would include, where reasonable, proportionate, and necessary,  
information about a ‘subject’s terrorism related criminal offending history, including any 
Police intelligence held relating to terrorist group affiliations, associations or activities. 
TREDS takes inspiration from disclosure schemes already employed to safeguard and 
protect children and vulnerable people from other crime types such as The Domestic 
Violence Disclosure Scheme (DVDS), also known as Clare’s Law; and the Child Sexual 
Offender Disclosure Scheme (CSODS), known as Sarah’s Law. The Terrorism, 
Radicalisation and Extremism Disclosure Scheme (TREDS) was designed by the author of 
this policy recommendation between June 2018 and February 2019 in response to the 
decline in public or community reporting of concerns related to terrorism, radicalisation 
and extremism. This decline is evidenced by Home Office statistics, which identify that of 
the 7,318 total referrals made in 2017/18, just 292 (4%) came from communities (Home 
Office, 2018). TREDS represents a distinct departure from existing reporting processes, and 
is underpinned by the principle of two-way information sharing between the public and 
authorities. This signifies a seismic shift toward a more inclusive and reciprocal 
relationship, and one which is likely to better empower individuals and communities to 
report concerns as and when they arise. 
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terrorism. The Prevent strategy has three specific strategic objectives: to respond to the 
ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it; prevent 
people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and 
support; and work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation that we 
need to address (HM Government, 2015).  
As the frequency of terror attacks perpetrated on British soil increases, with attacks in 
both London and Manchester in 2017, it becomes ever more crucial that authorities gain the 
support and cooperation of the British public in the prevention of violent extremism and 
terrorism. Communities must be empowered to proactively report radicalisation and terrorism 
related concerns to authorities if and when they arise (Dryden, 2017). Communities play a 
central role in the prevention of extremism and radicalisation, and their engagement and 
empowerment needs to be reinforced and supported as a matter of priority. However, 
community engagement and empowerment continues to be confronted with a variety of 
challenges, particularly a lack of trust and confidence in the government, police and public 
authorities (Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2018). Extremism and polarisation thrive 
when communities themselves do not directly challenge those among them who seek to 
radicalise others (Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2017). Indeed, within some 
communities people are afraid to expose their problems because they are concerned as to the 
impact it may have on others’ perceptions of their community; that it will fuel prejudice and 
hate; and that the media will portray the issue in an unsympathetic manner that will bring their 
entire community into disrepute (Casey, 2016).  
Speaking at the launch of a new cinema advertisement campaign to improve 
community reporting of terrorism related concerns, the head of U.K. Counter-Terrorism 
Policing, Neil Basu stated that more than a fifth of all terrorism related information passed to 
police from communities helps foil terrorist attacks, but cautioned that the worst case scenario 
was public complacency, revealing that there had been a dramatic fall in the number of 
instances whereby any such information was passed to police. More than 31,000 pieces of 
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information were passed to police in 2017, which has more than halved to 13,093 in 2018 
(ITV, 2019). 
 
Discussion 
 
Assessing the causality of low and declining public reporting 
The ‘suspect community’ theory identifies Muslims as being disproportionately and 
unfairly targeted by government Counter-Terrorism policy, a claim which is widely 
acknowledged as the primary reason for some Muslim communities refusing to engage with 
Prevent. Originally developed by Hillyard (1993) in relation to the Irish living in Britain at the 
height of the ‘troubles’, the ‘suspect community’ concept has gained much traction in its 
application to Muslims living in Post-9/11 and 7/7 Britain (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009). 
The Equality and Human Rights Commission Research report (2011), titled The impact of 
Counter-Terrorism measures on Muslim communities, states that when it comes to 
experiences of Counter-Terrorism, Muslim and non-Muslim participants from the same 
localities appear to live ‘parallel lives’. The report states that Counter-terrorism measures are 
contributing to a wider sense amongst Muslims that they are being treated as a ‘suspect 
community’ and targeted by authorities simply on the basis of their religion. Many 
participants, while not referring to specific laws or policies, felt that Counter-Terrorism law 
and policy generally was contributing towards a climate of fear and suspicion around 
Muslims, identifying them as a ‘suspect group’ (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 
2011).  
  Accusations of the (mis) use of arrest and stop-search powers by the police is cited by 
critics of Prevent as a further example of Muslims being treated as a ‘suspect community’ and 
being unfairly targeted by Counter-terrorism policy. Section 43 of the Terrorism Act (2000) 
allows a constable to stop and search a person whom he/she reasonable suspects to be 
involved in terrorist activity. Of all the people stopped and searched under S.43 of the 
Terrorism Act 2000 between 2009/10 and 2016/17 in London: 40% self-defined as white; 
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29% as Asian or Asian British; and 11% Black or Black British. Most recently, in the year 
ending 31 December 2017 in the Metropolitan Police Force area, 30% self-defined as white; 
27% Asian or Asian British, and 14% Black or Black British (House of Commons, 2018). 
Section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000 gives a police constable the power to arrest a person 
whom they reasonably suspect to be a terrorist. An arrest is Terrorism related if either at the 
time of arrest, or during any subsequent investigation, a constable suspects the arrested person 
to be involved in Terrorism. In the year ending 31 December 2017, of those arrested for 
Terrorism related offences: 41% were reported as being of Asian appearance, 35% white, 9% 
black, and 14% other. There were falls in the number of arrests across all ethnic groups. The 
largest decrease was seen for those of Asian ethnic appearance, which decreased by 46% 
when compared with the previous year (from 197 arrests to 106 arrests). As a result, the 
proportion of White people arrested exceeded the proportion of Asian people arrested (Home 
Office, 2018). Home Office statistics evidence that Referrals for concerns related to Islamist 
extremism actually decreased by 14% (2016/17, 3,704; 2017/18, 3,197), continuing the 
downward trend seen since 2015/16. Over the same time period a 36% increase has been 
evident in the number of referrals for concerns related to right wing extremism in 2017/18 
(1,312) when compared with 2016/17 (968), continuing the upward trend seen since 2015/16. 
(Home Office, 2018). 
From 1 July 2015, all schools, registered early years childcare providers and registered 
later years childcare providers are subject to a duty under section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism 
and Security Act 2015, in the exercise of their functions, to have “due regard to the need to 
prevent people from being drawn into terrorism” (Department for Education, 2015). The 
introduction of the Prevent Duty has been the source of much criticism, mainly the perception 
of the ‘securitisation’ of schools and their role as ‘spy’ and ‘police informant’. NUS Connect, 
the national Union of Students call for Prevent to be repealed, describing it as “fundamentally 
racist and Islamophobic, targeting the Muslim community whilst eroding civil liberties as part 
of a clampdown on political dissent and undermining the space for critical discussion in our 
universities, colleges and schools” (NUS Connect, 2019). The Casey Review, 2016, however, 
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states that “In order to undermine Prevent, opponents have deliberately distorted and 
exaggerated cases [of students referred to Prevent] by purporting to evidence how teachers 
have acted disproportionately” (Casey,2016). One such case, dubbed the “terrorist house 
case”, gained widespread media coverage in January 2016. Lancashire Police were reported in 
the media to have interviewed a pupil referred to Prevent after he had simply misspelled 
“terraced house” as “terrorist house” in a school creative writing exercise. In fact, the pupil 
had also written that “I hate it when my uncle hits me”. The teacher quite appropriately and 
acting in the best interests of the child, therefore raised a concern. No referral to Prevent was 
ever made. No Prevent officers were involved and Lancashire Police rightly maintain that 
they and the school acted responsibly and proportionately. Casey states that opponents of the 
programme do not appear to have any constructive alternative proposals for tackling terrorism 
and the effect they are having is not to improve the life chances of British Muslims but to 
make them feel even more alienated and isolated – and therefore more vulnerable to 
extremists and radicalisers. (Casey, 2016).  
Ostracism and backlash remain significant barriers to community reporting for 
concerns relating to terrorism, radicalisation and extremism. The 2017 report, Community 
Reporting Thresholds; Sharing information with authorities concerning violent extremist 
activity and involvement in foreign conflict (2017) identifies ‘backlash’ as perhaps the 
primary concern for individuals when deciding whether or not to make a referral over 
concerns relating to radicalisation, extremism and terrorism. The report states that much of the 
public discourse around community reporting focuses upon the lack thereof, with much less 
focus upon what happens after a referral is made, and the potential implications thereafter. 
Much concern is expressed about the negative, collective impacts of reporting, including 
various forms of backlash against those concerned. Concerns around the potential backlash 
from extremist groups or their members and supporters are substantial, although the most 
significant concern is around the referrer receiving a negative reaction, open hostility or even 
ostracism from members of their own community. Furthermore, many Muslim communities 
remain concerned over potential backlash from wider society and the media, fearing reporting 
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of concerns over radicalisation, extremism and terrorism in their communities may add to 
existing negative stereotypes of Muslim communities. The emotional challenges associated 
with ‘referring’ or ‘reporting’ a close family member or ‘intimate’ are undoubtedly a 
significant barrier to reporting. The Community Reporting Thresholds report uses the term 
‘intimate’ to describe the ‘referred individual’ as being a child or close family member of the 
referrer, as is often the case in the context of the existing reporting mechanism employed 
under the Prevent/Channel process. The individual choosing to ‘refer’ or ‘report’ their child or 
close family member is understandably regarded as being a particularly troublesome decision 
to make, even when they know it is in that person’s best interests. The report identifies how in 
such cases, referrers will often take time to attempt to discuss their concerns with the 
individual in question, exhausting all other alternatives before eventually making a referral 
(Thomas et al, 2017). 
 
The existing Prevent/Channel referral process 
If a member of the public or a frontline worker has a concern about an individual who 
they think might be vulnerable to radicalisation, they can refer them for appropriate support or 
intervention. Referrals from the general public can be made to their local authority or local 
police force. Public sector staff are encouraged to use their existing safeguarding mechanisms 
in the first instance to deal with such concerns, which oftentimes can be managed informally 
and without the need for onward referral. All referrals are received by the Police to consider 
whether the individual in question is already under investigation, if there is a genuine 
vulnerability, and if that vulnerability is related to terrorism. If the vulnerability is assessed as 
not being related to terrorism, the individual will be referred to mainstream services. If the 
vulnerability is assessed as being terrorism related, the individual in question will be referred 
onward to the Channel process (HM Government, 2018). Channel is a programme which 
focuses on providing support at an early stage to people who are identified as being 
vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. The programme uses a multi-agency approach to 
protect vulnerable people by: identifying individuals at risk; assessing the nature and extent of 
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that risk; and developing the most appropriate support plan for the individuals concerned. 
Channel is about ensuring that vulnerable children and adults of any faith, ethnicity or 
background receive support before their vulnerabilities are exploited by those that would want 
them to embrace terrorism, and before they become involved in criminal terrorist related 
activity (HM Government, 2015).  
 
Figure 1: Prevent/Channel referral process map 
Source: Home Office (2018a)  
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In 2017/18, a total of 7,318 individuals were subject to a referral due to concerns 
regarding their vulnerability to being drawn into terrorism. Of the 7,318 total referrals made, 
just 292 (4%) came from communities (Home Office, 2018). When compared to previous 
years, an initial stagnation is evident in referral percentages, with 226 (4%) for the period 
2016/17 (Home Office, 2018), and a decline when compared with 398 (5%) for 2015/16 
(Home Office, 2017). 
 
Figure 2: Breakdown of referrals by sector 
 
Source: Home Office (2018b) 
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What is the Terrorism, Radicalisation and Extremism Disclosure Scheme (TREDS)? 
 
The Terrorism, Radicalisation and Extremism Disclosure Scheme (TREDS) has been created 
as an additional measure to help Prevent and counter violent extremism and terrorism in the 
United Kingdom. TREDS represents a viable mechanism for a responsible adult (‘the 
applicant’) to make a disclosure request to joint local authority and Police Prevent teams 
where they feel an individual (‘the subject’) may pose a risk to a young or vulnerable person 
(‘the person at-risk’) in relation to terrorism, radicalisation or extremism. A disclosure is 
intended to empower the ‘applicant’ to take proactive steps to safeguard the ‘person at risk’ 
from the risk of harm posed by the ‘subject’. A successful disclosure would consist of 
information about a ‘subject’s’ terrorism related criminal offending history, including any 
Police intelligence held relating to extremist or terrorist group affiliations, associations or 
activities. TREDS takes inspiration from disclosure schemes already employed to safeguard 
and protect children and vulnerable people from other crime types such as The Domestic 
Abuse Disclosure Scheme (DADS), also known as Clare’s Law; and the Child Sexual 
Offender Disclosure Scheme (CSODS), known as Sarah’s Law.  
The Terrorism, Radicalisation and Extremism Disclosure Scheme (TREDS) has been 
designed in response to the decline in public or community reporting of issues related to 
terrorism, radicalisation and extremism, a decline evidenced by Home Office statistics, which 
identify that of the 7,318 total referrals made in 2017/18, just 292 (4%) came from 
communities (Home Office, 2018). TREDS reframes the debate around public reporting, 
offering communities a mechanism whereby action can be taken to proactively safeguard 
children and vulnerable people from individuals they believe may be intent on exploiting 
them for purposes pertaining to extremism and terrorism. This represents a distinct departure 
from existing reporting processes, whereby the focus of such measures has historically been a 
one-way movement of information from the public to the authorities. TREDS instead 
represents a two-way information sharing mechanism between the public and authorities, 
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which signifies a seismic shift toward a more inclusive and reciprocal relationship, and one 
which is likely to better empower individuals and communities to report concerns as and 
when they arise. 
 
The Terrorism, Radicalisation and Extremism Disclosure Scheme (TREDS) process 
The TREDS process consists of six stages, and has been developed through significant 
research of the two existing disclosure schemes and their policy documents; The Child Sex 
Offended (CSO) Disclosure Scheme (2010); and The Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme 
(DVDS) Guidance (2016).  
 
1) Initial Contact:  A concerned adult (‘the applicant’) would make initial contact to 
register their interest as an applicant. Historically, for other disclosure schemes this 
has been to Police, either via their local Police force website or in person at a Police 
station. However, in light of recent pilots and plans to roll out the principles proposed 
in operation Dovetail, namely the de-securitisation of Prevent and Channel processes, 
it is advised that an initial application would be made directly to the joint local 
authority and police Prevent team via an online form hosted on the local authority 
website. This maximises accessibility of the scheme to the applicant, and breaks down 
any barriers they may have perceived to exist by making an application directly to 
Police. It would, however remain possible for an applicant to make their initial contact 
in person to their local police force, a desire expressed by respondents in the 
Community Reporting Thresholds (2017) research into community reporting 
mechanisms. Following initial contact, preliminary checks will be conducted to 
establish whether there is any imminent or immediate risk of harm posed to the 
‘person at risk’ and whether the ‘subject’ is already under investigation. These initial 
checks should be completed as soon as possible, but no later than 24 hours after the 
initial contact. If information is identified during these initial checks which indicates 
an immediate or imminent risk of harm is posed to the ‘person at risk’ then the 
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TREDS process would terminate at this point, and immediate action must be taken 
through existing police and local authority safeguarding procedures.  
 
2) Face to Face Meeting: Once no imminent or immediate risk of harm has been 
identified, a member of the joint local authority and police Prevent team will review 
the initial application and contact the applicant to arrange a face to face meeting about 
the application. The face to face meeting should take place as soon as practicable, but 
no later than 10 days after the initial contact. The face to face meeting is designed 
to assess the motivation behind, and suitability of the application. The applicant must 
provide photo identification and confirmation of address. Acceptable photo 
identification would include a passport or drivers licence, and adequate proof of 
address being a utility bill or bank statement. However, it is accepted that some 
vulnerable individuals may not possess any of the above forms of identification. In 
this situation it would be acceptable to contact another agency or professional such as 
a health visitor or social worker in order to confirm the identity of the applicant. All 
applicants are required to sign a legal undertaking, indicating that they should not 
discuss their application unnecessarily with any other party, and that misuse of any 
disclosure information would render them liable to prosecution. Failure of the 
applicant to sign the legal agreement may result in the withdrawal of the application at 
this stage.  
 
3) Empowerment/Education: During the face to face meeting the applicant is provided 
with an information pack about the disclosure scheme, which will include details of 
how they can protect and safeguard the ‘person at risk’ during the interim period prior 
to the disclosure or non-disclosure decision. The information pack will be available 
both in physical booklet form, and online.  
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4) Threat/Risk Assessment: Police officers or authorised staff in the joint local 
authority and police Prevent team will conduct intelligence and criminal record checks 
on the ‘subject’, which will include Police National Computer (PNC), Police National 
Database (PND), various intelligence databases, and social care records. If at any point 
during this process it is identified that the ‘subject’ is already under investigation for 
terrorism related offences, the TREDS process would end here and the information 
gathered up to this point would be passed through appropriate channels to Counter-
Terrorism police. In light of recent pilots and plans to roll out the principles proposed 
in ‘Dovetail’, namely the de-securitisation of Prevent and Channel processes, the 
police role in conducting Police criminal record and and intelligence checks will 
remain, however the information should, where possible then be handed to local 
authority Prevent staff to proceed with the application process.  
Although the TREDS is focussed entirely upon Terrorism,Radicalisation and 
extremism, information discovered regarding threats of a different nature posed by the 
‘subject’ to children or vulnerable people will be shared with the ‘applicant’ or ’person 
at risk’ where appropriate, and with any other relevant agencies. For example, the 
discovery of the existence of previous convictions or significant police intelligence 
suggesting ‘the subject’s’ involvement in offences relating to child sexual abuse or 
domestic abuse may need to be disclosed to the ‘applicant’ or ‘person at risk’. In such 
instances, any intelligence gathered by police would be passed appropriately to the 
relevant police department who administer disclosure requests for that respective 
crime type. This will likely be their force’s local Protecting Vulnerable People 
department or public protection unit. Of equal note are instances whereby police 
checks reveal no identified threat posed to the ‘person at risk’ by the ‘subject’. On 
such occasions, which may be frequent, the ‘applicant’ is afforded peace of mind 
regarding the safety of the child or vulnerable person. The nature of the TREDS 
process, and other existing disclosure schemes in this regard means that the ‘subject’ 
need not ever know they were in fact the subject of a disclosure application, which in 
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turn negates any potential hostility or repercussion from ‘subject’ to ‘applicant’, or 
indeed the ‘person at risk’.  
 
5) Decision making and supervisory review: In light of recent pilots and plans for the 
‘de-securitisation’ of Prevent and Channel processes, the police inspector’s role as 
ultimate decision maker in the equivalent process for other disclosure schemes may be 
assigned instead to their local authority equivalent, such as a Prevent coordinator. In 
this context, the member of local authority Prevent staff processing the application 
would, at this stage, submit their disclosure/non-disclosure decision rationale to a 
senior member of the joint local authority and police Prevent team such as a Prevent 
coordinator or Police Inspector (or whoever the individual force designates) for review 
and ultimate decision making.  
 
6) The delivery of the disclosure/non-disclosure decision: The entire TREDS process 
should be completed within 30 days from initial contact. Other disclosure schemes 
operate within 35-45 day timeframes, however, owing to the seriousness of the 
potential threat and risk involved, appropriate resourcing should be committed to 
expedite this process. The officer will contact the parent/carer of the ‘person at risk’ 
and either disclose as appropriate, or notify of the decision not to disclose. Disclosure 
should only take place face to face with the ‘applicant’ or parent/guardian if the 
‘person at risk’ is under 18 years old, or the ‘person at risk’ directly if over 18 and 
they have capacity. The disclosure would be delivered verbally only. No written 
disclosure will be made under any circumstances, in order to prevent the information 
falling into the wrong hands or being used inappropriately or maliciously. The 
applicant will again be asked to confirm their understanding of and commitment to the 
sensitive and appropriate use of the disclosure information, and that inappropriate use 
may render them liable to prosecution.  
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Figure 3. TREDS Process Map 
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Hypothetical Case Study Examples 
 
Below are three hypothetical case study examples, which highlight a variety of situations 
whereby a Terrorism, Radicalisation and Extremism Disclosure Scheme (TREDS) application 
may be used effectively. These examples are not exhaustive, but are intended to add clarity as 
to its purpose and scope.  
 
Case study 1. 
Louise is a single parent of Alfie, 14. Louise has recently begun a relationship with 
Jay, but has heard rumours in the community that Jay is involved with a Far-Right group and 
may have previous convictions for Islamophobic hate crimes. Louise finds the Terrorism, 
Radicalisation and Extremism disclosure scheme (TREDS) online application form on her 
local authority’s website and completes an initial application.  
Louise subsequently receives disclosure regarding Jay, highlighting a previous 
conviction for a religiously motivated hate crime, and intelligence linking him to active 
involvement with a Far-Right group in the area. Louise uses this information to make the 
decision to end her relationship with Jay, citing other reasons, allowing her to protect her son 
and herself without Jay knowing she has made the application. Due to receiving disclosure 
though the TREDS process, Louise was able to take proactive steps to ensure that her son 
would not be influenced by an individual like Jay, who holds extreme views and has engaged 
in extremist violence. 
 
Case study 2.  
Paul and Alison live with their 16 year old daughter, Skye in Devon. The family are 
keen environmentalists and animal rights activists. The family recently attended a 
demonstration against animal cruelty, where their daughter, Skye met a 19 year old male 
named Dylan. Since the demonstration, Dylan and Skye have remained in contact and are 
planning to meet up. Paul and Alison decide to conduct an internet search of Dylan, as they 
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are interested in the high-profile animal rights work he claims to have been involved in. 
During the internet search information is found to suggest that Dylan has been involved in 
violent clashes with police during demonstrations. Paul and Alison oppose violence in all 
forms and do not wish for their daughter to be exposed in any way to it. Paul and Alison 
continue searching the internet and come across the Terrorism, Radicalisation and Extremism 
Disclosure Scheme (TREDS) on their local authority’s website and decide to submit an 
application regarding Dylan. The subsequent application process is completed, and the 
decision is made to disclose to Paul and Alison. The disclosure highlights that Dylan has 
served a short custodial sentence for causing significant criminal damage to an animal testing 
facility, and the assault of its staff members. 
Paul and Alison spoke with Skye and relayed the information provided to them by 
police. Skye was shocked that Dylan had been in trouble with the police and had a criminal 
record. Skye was understandably upset but was grateful to be made aware, and subsequently 
ended her relationship with Dylan. Skye has ambitions to go to university and work 
peacefully to end animal cruelty, and knew that continuing to be associated with Dylan could 
be harmful to her future.  
 
Case study 3.  
Junaid is 16 years old and lives with his elderly grandmother and maternal aunty. 
Junaid has poor school attendance, and although he sets off to school most days, he does not 
always arrive there. A local resident and a friend of Junaid’s mother and father has noticed 
him recently arrive at the bus stop in uniform with other pupils every Monday, but get into a 
car with an older male instead. The family friend recognised the male as being known locally 
as ‘Zed’, who is rumoured to be known to Police in relation to Terrorism related offences.  
The family friend saw this pattern emerge over a number of weeks and became 
increasingly concerned for Junaid’s safety. Fearing for the safety of Junaid, the family friend 
decides to submit a Terrorism, Radicalisation and Extremism Disclosure Scheme (TREDS) 
application via their local authority website. Upon conducting police checks it emerged that 
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‘Zed’ was at the time subject to strict supervision, which imposed various prohibitions upon 
his interaction with others, following his serving of a prison sentence for committing a 
terrorism related offence. This information was disclosed to Junaid’s grandmother and aunty, 
who were able to implement more stringent measures to protect Junaid, and relay to him that 
‘Zed’ is not an appropriate individual with whom to associate. ‘Zed’ was subsequently 
arrested by Police and found in possession of an unauthorised mobile phone, contrary to his 
licence conditions. ‘Zed’ was later recalled to prison.   
 
Learning From Existing Disclosure Schemes: The Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme 
(DVDS); and the Child Sexual Offence Disclosure Scheme (CSODS) Pilot Reviews. 
 
In 2012/13, a 14 month pilot to test a national Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme (DVDS) 
took place across Four Police force areas. The review of that pilot process highlighted the 
perceptions of those involved, both public and professional, providing feedback on its 
efficacy and areas for improvement. Overall those involved were positive about the process. 
The major perceived benefit of the scheme was that it gives individuals information that may 
assist them in making a more informed choice about the suitability of their relationships. The 
process was considered fit for purpose, and those who used the scheme were generally 
satisfied with the experience. There were two main areas for improvement identified by those 
involved, both public and professional; That the scheme was not adequately publicised, 
resulting in a significant degree of misunderstanding and a lack of awareness of the scheme’s 
existence and purpose; and the significant level of bureaucracy of the process, primarily in 
relation to the lengthy paperwork and repetition involved. During the pilot period, 386 initial 
applications were received, of which almost one-third (29%, 111 applications) resulted in a 
disclosure (Home Office, 2016). The most recent available data on the Domestic Violence 
Disclosure Scheme identifies that for the 40 forces that were able to supply data on both 
applications and disclosures under the DVDS, 57% of the 6,313 “right to know” applications 
made resulted in disclosures (3,594) in the year ending March 2018. A lower proportion 
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(44%) of the 4,655 “right to ask” applications resulted in disclosures in the same year (2,055 
based on 41 forces providing both figures (Office for National Statistics, 2018). These 
statistics represent 5,649 individuals safeguarded and protected from harm in the year ending 
March 2018 who may not have otherwise been in the absence of the DVDS. 
In February 2008 the Home Secretary announced a 12 month pilot of the Child Sex 
Offender Disclosure Scheme (CSODS). The intention was to pilot a process whereby member 
of the public can register their interest in a names individual in relation to concerns about their 
history of sexual offending against children. Where concerns are discovered, the presumption 
is that relevant information will be shared with the appropriate member of the public best 
placed to protect the person at risk. The review of that process aimed to identify how 
successfully the pilots have provided members of the public with a formal mechanism for 
requesting disclosure of information about individuals who have unsupervised access to 
children, and who may have previous involvement in sexual offending against children. Of 
the small number of applicants interviewed, most were largely satisfied with the pilot process, 
valuing timely contact and the professional conduct of staff. On the whole, applicants 
interviewed thought the pilot contributed to general levels of alertness about risks to, and 
protection of, children. Police and offender managers interviewed perceived that the 
disclosure process formalised what they thought should be good practice in child protection. It 
was seen as providing greater clarity for staff by focusing on risk, focusing on the child, and 
permitting the sharing of information with members of the public. The two primary areas of 
improvement to be made were identified as; Marketing and publicity, whereby it was felt that 
the scheme had failed to reach an adequately significant audience to garner the desired 
response rate, and; The level and consistency of the training provided to staff, where some 
report the training as adequate, whereas other describe the training as representing a briefing 
session rather than actual training. During the pilot period, 585 initial enquiries were made, of 
which 21 (4%) resulted in disclosure (Home Office, 2007). Unfortunately it has not been 
possible to obtain up-to-date referral and disclosure statistics for the Child Sexual Offence 
Disclosure Scheme (CSODS) following its permanent implementation. 
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The above pilot reviews of the existing disclosure schemes; the Domestic Violence Disclosure 
Scheme (DVDS); and the Child Sexual Offence Disclosure Scheme (CSODS) respectively, 
provide crucial information regarding their strengths and areas for improvement, which have 
been considered and applied when creating the Terrorism, Radicalisation and Extremism 
Disclosure Scheme (TREDS);  
Firstly, a lack of publicity and awareness of the disclosure schemes amongst 
practitioners and communities was highlighted in the pilot reviews for the DVDS and 
CSODS; this has been taken into account when creating TREDS, with significant publicity 
and awareness raising high on the agenda for potential pilot areas. Police forces would receive 
appropriate training and be provided with information packs and process maps to disseminate 
to their officers and staff. Awareness raising sessions would be held in local authority settings 
to raise awareness of TREDS amongst practitioners in relevant services. Television, radio, 
print, and social media advertisements would be considered as a means of raising awareness 
amongst communities of the existence of the scheme and its scope.  
Secondly, bureaucracy and complicated and repetitive paperwork was highlighted as 
the other main criticism of the DVDS and CSODS processes; officers or members of staff 
completing the DVDS and CSODS processes are required to complete each stage of the 
process either manually by hand, or typed onto the forms in Word format. The forms then 
need to be printed, signed and scanned back in before being saved onto a computer. Having 
personally completed both the DVDS and CSODS processes, I can attest to their labour-
intensive and archaic nature. Therefore, the TREDS process will be completed within an 
intuitive online portal, allowing supporting material to be uploaded, and ensuring the safety 
and security of the information contained within. Supervisors can access the application to 
complete their supervisory review stage and either authorise disclosure, or conclude the 
application as a non-disclosure outcome. 
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The Potential Opposition to TREDS 
Critics may point to the sharing of the details of a ‘subject’s’ Terrorism related offending 
history or relevant police intelligence as representing a further form of social punishment for 
an offender attempting to reintegrate into society. It is feared that this could result in 
stigmatisation and potentially the facilitation of further radicalisation. However, as with the 
most high risk domestic abuse perpetrators and child sex offenders, a terrorist offender or 
suspect’s right to privacy or anonymity must remain secondary to the safeguarding and 
protection of children and vulnerable people. The police have common law powers to disclose 
information about a person’s known history of violence or abuse, normally relating to 
previous convictions or charges, to the public where there is a pressing need for disclosure of 
the information in order to prevent further crime (Home Office, 2016). These common law 
powers inform the entire disclosure and safeguarding principles underpinning TREDS.  
Article 8 of The Human Rights Act (1998) states that “Everyone has the right to 
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. There shall be no 
interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in 
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety, or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others” (Legislation.gov.uk, 2019). The TREDS process should be administered 
whilst giving due consideration to its impact upon and interaction with the Human Rights Act 
1998. The consequences for the ‘subject’ should his details be disclosed, against the nature 
and extent of the risk the ‘subject’ poses to the ‘person at risk’ should be carefully considered. 
Critics should be reassured that the threshold for a disclosure under TREDS is necessarily 
high, and the rigorous application process ensures, as much as is possible, that disclosure data 
will not be misused. Furthermore, no specific offence details will ever be disclosed, merely 
that an individual has been convicted of a terrorist offence, or that police hold significant 
intelligence suggesting their involvement in extremism or terrorism.  
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Information relating to a person’s previous convictions is sensitive personal data under 
the Data Protection Act 1998, and therefore Police and other agencies must be satisfied that a 
decision to disclose is in accordance with the eight principles set out in the Act (The Child 
Sex Offender Disclosure Scheme Guidance Document, 2007). Article 17 (The right to be 
forgotten) of the Data Protection Regulations, Data Protection Act (2018) primarily regulates 
erasure obligations. Under this legislation, personal data must be erased immediately where 
the data are no longer needed for their original purpose, or the data subject has withdrawn his 
consent and there is no other legal ground for processing. However, the Right to be Forgotten 
is not unreservedly guaranteed. It is limited, especially with the right of freedom of expression 
and information or where the processing of data is necessary to comply with legal obligations, 
or where it is in the public interest (General Data Protection Regulation, 2019). Furthermore, 
The General Data Protection Regulations, Data Protection Act (2018) and Human Rights laws 
are not barriers to justified information sharing, but provide a framework to ensure personal 
data is shared appropriately. Under the GDPR and Data Protection Act (2018), personal 
information may be shared without consent if there is a lawful reason to do so, such as where 
Safety may be at risk (West Yorkshire Safeguarding Children’s Board, 2019). 
 
Proof of the Appetite for New Community Reporting Methods 
 
The Home Office is proposing making alterations to the Channel process; aiming to ‘de-
securitise’ the process by transferring responsibilities for some elements of Channel from the 
police to the government, where they would sit more closely with local authorities’ wider 
safeguarding responsibilities (Local Government Association, 2018). This move by the Home 
Office suggests their acknowledgement of the need to reassess the efficacy of some elements 
of the Prevent and Channel processes being police-led, and appreciating that the transference 
of some functions may be crucial in garnering more trust and support from communities to 
report their concerns.  
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In an Open letter on the UK’s ‘Prevent’ Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Amnesty 
International UK describe Prevent as being developed without a firm evidence base and being 
rooted in a vague and expansive definition of “extremism”. The open letter urges member of 
the House of Lords to Support amendments which demand the independent review of Prevent 
(Amnesty International UK, 2018). Indeed, amendments 57 and 57A of the Counter-
Terrorism and Border Security Bill (2018) call for the independent review of the 
Government’s Prevent strategy (UK Parliament, 2018). Speaking in a Home Office article, 
security minister Ben Wallace stated “I have decided that the time is now right to initiate a 
review of Prevent. Over the last two years the Home Office has built on the solid work of 
Prevent by releasing annual statistics, which clearly show that Prevent is not about singling 
out any particular group or ideology. I am proud we have helped divert hundreds of people 
away from posing a real threat and put them back on the path of living a fulfilling, law 
abiding life. This review should expect those critics of Prevent, who often use distortions and 
spin, to produce solid evidence of their allegations” (Home Office, 2019).  
The Government’s 2018 Prevent strategy update identifies amongst others, two 
particular strategic objectives which support the desire for the implementation of new 
methods to improve community and public reporting; 
 
1) “We will do more to increase the proportion of referrals that come from communities and 
friends and families of vulnerable individuals – people who are often the first to have 
concerns”.  
 
2)  “We will develop a series of multi-agency pilots to trial methods to improve our 
understanding of those at risk of involvement in terrorism and enable earlier intervention” 
(Home Office, 2018).  
 
This clearly evidences the appetite for the implementation of new mechanisms for 
improving public reporting. Furthermore, the recently announced independent review of 
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Prevent represents an opportunity for the review of current mechanisms and working 
practices, and for new and innovative ones like TREDS to be given an opportunity to 
demonstrate their capability. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This policy recommendation is intended to represent a catalyst for the implementation of the 
Terrorism, Radicalisation and Extremism Disclosure Scheme (TREDS) within the United 
Kingdom, as an additional mechanism to aid efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism 
and terrorism. TREDS is not intended to replace current reporting mechanisms, but to 
compliment them, providing an alternate route by which communities can report concerns 
relating to terrorism, radicalisation and extremism. The UK Government is urged to duly 
consider the implementation of TREDS as a pilot for a minimum period of Twelve months in 
selected local authority areas, and ultimately that TREDS be implemented on a permanent 
basis in every Prevent priority local authority area within the United Kingdom. 
Whether a proponent or opponent of the Prevent strategy and the government’s wider 
efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism and terrorism- the current divisiveness in this 
regard acts only to further marginalise many Muslim communities, and empowers the 
extremists and terrorists who oppose our shared values. The upcoming review of the Prevent 
strategy should be welcomed by all who are committed to safeguarding children and 
vulnerable people from radicalisation, extremism and terrorism. Critics of Prevent should 
remain constructive, and the media should be held to account for inaccurate, misleading or 
inflammatory reporting, which cynically misrepresents the programme and exacerbates 
community tensions. Government and civil society must work together tirelessly to improve 
current processes, working practices, and to strive to develop new and innovative ways to 
better tackle radicalisation, extremism and terrorism.  
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